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The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established in 1997 with the dual 
purposes of assisting non-Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development and assisting Annex I 
Parties in achieving compliance with their quantified greenhouse gas (GHG) emission commitments. This 
paper looks at the achievements of the CDM to date and assesses the possible role that CDM might play in 
any transition towards more stringent future mitigation commitments at the global level.  In particular, the 
paper begins to assess the ability for the CDM to act as a bridge towards achievement of cost-effective 
GHG mitigation, across different countries and regions, and of sustainable development objectives in 
developing countries.   
Market demand for GHG credits from CDM projects comes from Annex I countries’ emission 
commitments.  Annex I countries can meet those commitments by domestic as well as international 
emission mitigation activities, including the CDM. The CDM can be an attractive compliance option as it 
can help meet Annex I GHG commitments more cost-effectively through project-based activities that are 
consistent with host-countries’ sustainable development priorities. The extent of the demand for CDM 
credits depends on the stringency of emission commitments, the “gap” between countries’ emission 
commitments and actual emissions, and the relative use of CDM and other means of meeting emission 
commitments.  
Although there are no officially-registered CDM project activities as yet, there are already several 
achievements of the CDM. These include the development of proposed CDM projects, increasing 
awareness of climate change mitigation options among possible investors and others that may facilitate 
transactions (i.e. governments), and the strengthening of climate-relevant institutions within countries. This 
paper examines information from more than 160 emission-reduction project activities being developed as 
potential CDM projects that are currently underway or planned in 48 countries and several different 
sectors. These project activities anticipate reducing greenhouse gas emissions by almost 32 Mt CO2-
eq/year (or slightly more than Ireland’s CO2 emissions in 1990) during the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period and by more than 50 Mt CO2-eq. before 2008. The current size of the CDM market is 
expected to grow to between 50- to 500 mt CO2-eq per year during the first commitment period (Grubb 
2003). For comparison, the estimated size of the emissions “gap”1 of Annex I Parties (excluding the US 
and Australia) has been estimated between 275-880 Mt CO2-eq in 2010 (Grubb 2003).  
Proposed CDM projects include a relatively wide spread of activities and host countries. However, 
anticipated emission reductions from CDM project activities are concentrated in three sectors, i.e. 
renewable electricity generation, reduction of methane emissions and F-gas decomposition. Anticipated 
emission reductions are also concentrated in a few countries, e.g. India, Brazil, China, and Indonesia. With 
a few exceptions, the countries expecting to generate large amounts of credits from proposed CDM 
                                                     
1 The “gap” is the difference between actual emissions and emission commitments.   Even if the emission “gap” was 
close to zero in Annex I countries, it is still likely that there would be a demand for CERs in the 1st Kyoto 
commitment period, given the preferences of some market players. 
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projects to date are also often countries that are recipients of a significant proportion of total flows of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of the poorest nations that are unable to attract outside investment 
for other reasons also do not appear to be attracting significant interest in investment in CDM projects, 
even if they have established a “designated national authority” for the CDM to facilitate and approve 
transactions.2 . 
Renewable electricity projects account for 56% of the project portfolio in terms of numbers of projects, and 
approximately 37% of the portfolio in terms of expected annual credits. Transport and energy-efficiency 
projects account for only a small share of the total project portfolio (2% and 3% respectively of expected 
annual credits), as do projects in Africa (5% of expected annual credits). The proportion of “brownfield”, 
relatively low-cost and large-volume emission reduction options such as F-gas decomposition and 
reduction of methane emissions (which together account for 40% of the portfolio in terms of expected 
emission reductions) has grown very rapidly since early 2003, although few such projects are currently 
underway. These project types, as well as others not yet included in the CDM project portfolio, such as 
reduction of N2O from adipic acid production, have the potential to dominate the expected market for 
CDM credits during the first commitment period and to reduce CDM credit prices from current levels of 
between $3-6 per tonne of CO2-equivalent. The current price of emission credits varies according to the 
project’s characteristics and distribution of risks between CER-buyers and sellers, with some CER-buyers 
being prepared to pay a premium for development-friendly projects. 
The success of the CDM will depend in part upon the amount of investment it is able to stimulate in GHG 
mitigation activities and on the other types of long-term benefits that such activities are able to deliver. To 
date, more than $800m has been allocated to carbon funds or CDM (or CDM/JI) programmes. These funds, 
which are mainly public, focus on providing a revenue stream for emission credits from a project rather 
than providing up-front project finance. This $800m is a conservative figure as other private sources of 
funding for CDM project activities are also expected to be available.  Taking these other sources of CDM 
investment into account, CDM financing to 2012 is likely to be more than $1 billion.   
This flow of funds ($1b) into the CDM is small relative to other flows of foreign investment from 
developed countries to developing countries, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) from the private 
sector or official development assistance (ODA) from the public sector.  However, such funds may have 
the potential to leverage six to eight times this amount – or about 6-8 billion USD of investment capital 
towards GHG mitigation activities. This compares to GEF investment in climate change of $1.4b between 
1991-2002, thus it is significant with respect to climate change. However, flows of investment in CDM are 
likely to be only a small fraction of FDI and ODA flows in any particular country in a year. To the extent 
that CDM investments stimulate or add to the ongoing private investment flows in a country, the CDM 
may be uniquely well placed to stimulate transfer of low- or no-GHG emitting technologies. Achieving 
transfer of climate-friendly technology is essential if mitigation is to be extended successfully across the 
world in the coming decades. Thus, the CDM has the potential to contribute not only to reducing the 
overall cost of meeting GHG objectives, but also to lasting technology change over time.  
International governance of CDM projects focuses on assessing the GHG-reduction aspect of CDM project 
activities. This assessment is led by the CDM Executive Board under the UNFCCC, involves many 
different actors and can take several months, particularly if the proposed project activity is not using a pre-
approved baseline and monitoring methodology. In contrast, the host country alone assesses the 
compatibility of a proposed project to its sustainable development objectives. Some potential host countries 
have set out criteria by which to do this. These criteria can differ from country to country.  Many proposed 
CDM projects have clear benefits through lowering local environmental pollution or boosting economic 
                                                     
2 The establishment of a “designated national authority” is a prerequisite to approval of CDM projects as set out in 
decision 17/CP.7 in the Marrakech Accords. 
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development and/or employment – as well as reducing emissions of GHG. Other project activities may 
have few outputs other than CERs and few direct environmental, economic or social effects other than to 
reduce GHG emissions, although they may have some positive indirect effects in non-GHG areas, 
particularly if some of the CDM revenues are earmarked for other purposes.   
Experience with developing CDM project activities has also highlighted some important barriers to 
increased CDM activity during the first commitment period. These barriers include financial and 
institutional issues, risks and uncertainties associated with generating CERs and delays in approving CDM 
project activities and methodologies. Some uncertainties, delays and other transaction costs will be reduced 
– at least for selected project types – once there are a greater number of approved baseline methodologies 
for particular project types from the CDM Executive Board (EB) and/or if the CDM EB approves 
“consolidated” methodologies for grid-connected electricity projects and landfill gas projects. If this occurs 
in 2004, it could still encourage further interest and possibly development of project types requiring a long 
lead-time to generate emission reductions (such as renewable electricity generation activities) – although 
their attractiveness as a CDM investment will still depend on their cost-effectiveness compared to other 
possible mitigation options. Successfully addressing such barriers may be key to increasing the importance 
of the CDM.   
Project search costs could be reduced by encouraging potential project participants in host countries to 
bring forward project ideas (e.g. to their DNA) and by facilitating initial technical appraisal in the host 
country or by using a “unilateral” CDM-type model. However, this could require significant institutional 
capacity in potential host countries and is also less likely to lead to technology transfer. Thus, it may not be 
widely applicable to non-Annex I countries, at least not those in early stages of development. Project 
validation costs could be reduced by encouraging the development of validators in CDM host countries. 
While there has been a positive start to the CDM, the contribution that CDM is expected to make to 
emission reductions in the first Kyoto commitment period is likely to be small. However, the lessons 
learned to date from the CDM, and its contribution to setting-up a carbon market are already quite 
valuable. A significant increase in size of the CDM market is feasible. The practical mitigation potential in 
2010 of energy efficiency, renewable energy activities and methane gas capture from landfills and fossil 
fuel systems in non-Annex I countries has been estimated at 470 mt CO2-eq at $5/t CO2-eq (TAA 2004) 
and that from F-gas reduction in China alone has been estimated at 90 mt CO2-eq/year (Lu 2004). 
Looking further into the future to a post-2012 regime, the role that the CDM, or any project-based 
mechanism generating emission credits, could play depends on the architecture of and participation in 
mitigation commitments. In order to deliver emission benefits at a large enough scale to slow growth in 
global emissions, such a regime would clearly need to deliver deeper emission reductions than those 
foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol. Stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will only 
be possible if all major emitting countries take on some form of commitment over the next few decades to 
begin to curb and eventually reverse growth in global emissions. As part of a future climate regime, any 
project-based mechanism would sensibly build on the institutions developed and project-level experience 
gained by companies and countries currently implementing the CDM. Current investors in CDM projects 
do not have a clear signal on the need for (or value of) GHG credits post-2012, thus increasingly the focus 
of investments is on near-term, “brownfield” and low cost emission reductions. In addition, resolving the 
tension between global emission reductions and local benefits is a key challenge for the future which could 
help to build local support for global GHG mitigation through the CDM or a similar project-based 
mechanism.  All of these suggestions point to the valuable learning that is occurring through emerging 
experience with the CDM, pointing to lessons that will hopefully establish a knowledge base and a starting 




1. INTRODUCTION  
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established in 1997 with the dual 
purposes of assisting non Annex I parties in achieving sustainable development and assisting Annex I 
Parties in achieving compliance with their quantified emission reductions of greenhouse gases (GHG). This 
paper looks at the achievements of the CDM to date, assesses the possible role that CDM might play in any 
transition towards more stringent future mitigation commitments at the global level.  In particular, the 
paper begins to assess the ability for the CDM to act a bridge towards achievement of both cost-effective 
GHG mitigation across different countries and regions, and the promotion of sustainable development 
objectives in developing countries.     
The CDM does not exist in isolation. Market demand for credits from CDM projects (“certified emission 
reductions” or CERs) occurs as one set of countries (those listed in Annex I to the Convention) has a 
regulatory constraint on its GHG emissions and can offset domestic emissions with emission benefits from 
CDM project activities located in non-Annex I countries. . Demand for CERs therefore depends both on 
the stringency of emission commitments for Annex I countries, the “gap” between emission commitments 
and likely emissions (which depends in turn upon the countries willing to take on such agreements3), and 
the relative use of CERs or other means of meeting emission commitments.4 Thus, the CDM is, in the short 
term, a GHG-neutral instrument which extends to countries without emission commitments the flexibility 
in where emission reductions can occur. This flexibility can help reduce the total cost of achieving 
emissions commitments. In the longer term, experience with implementing GHG-friendly project activities 
under the CDM can help encourage development of such activities under business-as-usual, and thus help 
to move countries to a more sustainable development pathway.  
The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation 
CDM and JI projects generate credits from certain eligible activities that reduce GHG emissions or 
enhance carbon “sinks”. These credits are generated in one country and are used by outside investors to 
offset GHG emissions in another country. CDM projects are for transactions between developing and 
industrialised countries – or those listed in Annex I of the Convention.  JI projects are for project-based 
credit transactions conducted among Annex I countries.  Eligibility criteria are different for the different 
mechanisms.   
CDM project activities enable developing countries to voluntarily participate GHG emission mitigation, 
that is, in the absence of legally binding emission commitments. By allowing flexibility as to where 
emission-reducing or sink enhancement projects are undertaken, as well as in which sectors and gases 
mitigation occurs, the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms reduce the cost for developed country 
(Annex I) Parties of attaining their emission commitments. 
Following the establishment of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol (COP3, 1997) several years were needed in 
order to agree the framework in which CDM project activities would operate. These “modalities and 
procedures” were agreed in the Marrakech Accords (COP7, 2001). The Marrakech Accords lay out several 
issues - including the functioning of the CDM’s Executive Board (EB), which supervises the CDM, 
                                                     
3 In particular, the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol has reduced the likely demand (and price) for 
CERs. 
4 Annex I countries can also use domestic policies and measures, credits from “joint implementation” projects, or 
traded “assigned amount units” to meet their emission commitments. 
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participation requirements, as well as validation, registration and monitoring issues. These give general 
guidance on how to estimate the emission benefits of projects. Further rulemaking on the CDM emerged in 
2002 and 2003 with agreement on simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale emission reduction 
CDM project activities and a framework for afforestation and reforestation (A/R) CDM project activities5.  
Agreement should also be reached by COP10 on processes for small-scale A/R CDM projects. These 
rulemaking decisions have allowed the CDM project preparation to move forward, well in advance of the 
formal implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Kyoto mitigation  commitment period (2008-2012) – 
although not as fast as had originally been hoped.  
In parallel with drawing up rules governing the CDM, project development has been getting underway. 
Indeed, there is now almost a decade’s experience with setting up “joint” GHG mitigation projects: first 
under the FCCC’s pilot phase for “Activities Implemented Jointly” and subsequently as potential projects 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).   
Project documentation detailed in Annex 1 indicates that the importance of currently proposed CDM 
activities in different sectors is expected to be at least 32 million CO2-eq/year during the first commitment 
period (2008-2012)6. This is greater than Ireland’s CO2 emissions in 1990. Many more project activities, 
for which data are unavailable, are underway or being developed. Still more potential projects, yet to be 
initiated, could be implemented and generate emission reductions by 2012. Thus the estimated importance 
of CDM project activities during the first commitment period should be much higher than this figure.   
This 32 million tons CO2-eq. reduction is not insignificant, but it is balanced by an allowance to emit an 
equivalent amount in Annex I countries that would otherwise have been reduced domestically. However, it 
is a small fraction of the currently-anticipated “gap” between projected emissions and Kyoto targets or the 
potential “demand” for CERs by Annex I countries excluding the US and Australia, which Grubb (2003) 
estimates to be between 275 - 880 mt CO2-eq. 32 million tonnes of CO2-eq. is also dwarfed by the size and 
expected increase in world emissions of GHG. For example, the increase in total energy-related CO2 
emissions7 between 1990 and 2010 is expected to be 7.4 billion tons (IEA 2002 and IEA 2003b)8. Non-
Annex I countries are estimated to account for the majority (5.2 billion tons or 70%) of this increase under 
a business-as-usual scenario (IEA 2003).  
Huge investments are needed in order to satisfy the world’s growing demand for energy goods and 
services. The energy sector is projected to require $16 trillion investment by 2030 (IEA 2003). Investments 
will also be needed in other GHG-producing sectors, such as industry and agriculture. These investments 
will be needed both for equipment and infrastructure. Because capital stock is often long-lived, turnover is 
sometimes slow.  Today’s choices on types of equipment or production processes will affect the levels of 
GHG emissions for several decades hence. The challenge is to encourage a significant proportion of 
investment for new or replacement systems to “leapfrog” to such lower-GHG choices. 
Linking future GHG emissions requires significant investment today in environmentally-friendly goods 
and services from the private sector. Typically, though not always, improved environmental performance 
will have an added cost.  A chief motivation in the design of the CDM was to stimulate private sector 
involvement to improve GHG performance of on-going investments. Although the role of the public sector 
is not excluded and has to date been important, some private sector monies are also already financing CDM 
project activity development directly and indirectly (e.g. via contributions to carbon funds and 
                                                     
5 The modalities and procedures for A/R projects are for the first commitment period only. 
6 This number includes projected emission reductions from the projects listed in Annex 1.  
7 Excluding emissions from international marine and air bunkers. 
8 Total energy-related emissions in 2010 are projected to be 27.5 billion tons CO2 (IEA 2002). 
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development of “unilateral” CDM projects). Making investment in environmentally-friendly goods a 
routine decision for both the public and private sector is key to moving towards a more sustainable 
development pathway. 
It is therefore timely to review CDM experience to date and to consider its expected role during the first 
commitment period.  This paper aims to do just that. Section 2 outlines the nature of the “CDM challenge” 
and the different flows of investment. Section 3 provides a stock-taking of developments under the CDM 
to date. Section 4 highlights key conclusions from this analysis. 
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2. CONTEXT  
On the horizon of international climate change negotiations is the question about next steps on global 
mitigation. Beyond contentious debate how much and how fast to limit greenhouse gas emissions, the 
existence of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which 167 countries have ratified, reflects 
broad international agreement that climate change is underway and that something needs to be done about 
it. The Convention’s objective (Article 2) notes the need to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases so as to limit the pace and magnitude of climate change, while assuring food security, 
ability of ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, and sustainable economic development for the 
world’s nations.  Stabilisation of concentrations at any level will require deep emission reductions globally 
over the next half of century compared to existing trends (Watson et al. 2001; Philibert et al. 2003; Corfee 
Morlot and Hoehne 2003).  The main question on the table for international negotiators is how to facilitate 
a transition to low-emission global development pathways in a cost-effective manner so as to assure  a 
stable climate for future generations to come. 
Achieving significant global emission reductions in the next half a century will only be possible if the 
world’s largest emitting nations participate in mitigation efforts, limiting emissions below what they would 
otherwise be.  This group of countries includes not only the developed countries but also the largest and 
most rapidly industrialising developing countries as well as large “transition” economy countries. For 
example, the IEA’s World Energy Outlook (2002) projects that the share of energy-related CO2 emitted by 
non-OECD countries will rise from 45% of the world’s total in 2000 to 57% in 2030, with emissions from 
China will more than doubling (from 3.1 to 6.7 billion tons) in the same period. Successfully avoiding 
dangerous climate change will thus depend upon an ability to widen participation in mitigation efforts. 
While the Convention commits all countries to prepare and adopt programmes and policies to address 
climate change, it does not require developing countries to do so in specific time frames nor does it 
quantify levels of mitigation for developing countries.  As a result, the CDM, in which participation is 
purely voluntary, may currently be the main focus of mitigation efforts in many developing countries. The 
interest for developing countries to participate in the CDM as project “hosts” lies in the possibility to 
attract new investment to projects that will contribute to sustainable development in the near-term, while 
also facilitating learning about greenhouse gas mitigation possibilities. This knowledge may be particularly 
valuable over the longer-term as international pressure builds for deeper emission reductions at the global 
level. The demand for CDM, on the other hand, is based in the mandatory emission constraints undertaken 
in Annex I countries. 
Responding to the opportunities presented by the CDM, many developing countries have begun to 
establish national institutions or mechanisms to facilitate or promote CDM investments (see Section 3). As 
a potential win-win approach to voluntary GHG mitigation, the CDM has attracted the attention of many 
developing country governments and business actors. In those developing countries that are actively 
pursuing the CDM, it is seen as a means to attract new, foreign capital and possibly also to stimulate 
technology transfer. As noted above, it is also a means to engage a wide range of different types of actors 
in learning about the technical and economical aspects of mitigation opportunities.  Only time will tell 
whether the investment opportunities pursued will yield the expected environmental and economic benefits 
to the partners involved.  
A key question is: How significant is the CDM likely to be given the range of other factors that influence 
socio-economic development, technology change and emission trends in developing countries?  One way is 
to compare the flows of investment likely to go to CDM with other sources of foreign financing available 




2.1 Investment flows for development and technology change9 
The total flows of investment available in any particular country for development and technology change is 
comprised of both foreign and domestic sources.  In developing countries, the size of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from industrialised countries relative to domestic financing is still relatively low, with 
FDI estimated to be approximately 50 billion USD in 2002 (Figure 1).  By comparison, foreign investment 
from other developing countries is roughly twice this amount and domestic investment in the same year is 
estimated at approximately 1 trillion USD (OECD 2003a).  Domestic capital could be used to support 
CDM investment through the unilateral CDM approach and some analysts have begun to look at the 
potential to generate CDM projects of this type (Janssen 2002).  







1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Other  pr ivate f l ows




Source:  OECD DAC - Creditor Reporting System 2003 
Notes:  Data for developing countries only, excluding flows to developed countries and other aid recipients e.g. central and 
eastern European countries, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan and Israel. 1) Official Development Assistance (ODA): grants and 
loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries); 2) Other Official Flows 
(OOF): Transactions by the official sector with countries on the DAC List of Aid Recipients which do not meet the conditions for 
eligibility as official development assistance or official aid, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or 
because they have a grant element of less than 25%; 3) Direct Investment (also referred to as FDI here): Investment made to 
acquire or add to a lasting interest in an enterprise in a country on the DAC List of Aid Recipients. "Lasting interest" implies a 
long-term relationship where the direct investor has a significant influence on the management of the enterprise, reflected by 
ownership of at least 10% of the shares, or equivalent voting power or other means of control. In practice it is recorded as the 
change in the net worth of a subsidiary in a recipient country to the parent company, as shown in the books of the latter. 4) Other 
private flows: Mainly reported holdings of equities issued by firms in aid recipient countries. 
Although foreign investments from one developing country to another are potentially large and could also 
shape CDM (along with domestic financing), flows of investment from OECD countries are of interest 
because they have the potential to deliver much higher technology transfer and innovation benefits.  
Evidence indicates that many of the world’s new technologies originate in OECD countries and that FDI 
thus has the potential to transfer such technology out of the country of origin (OECD 2002a).  FDI may 
also be a means to improve environmental performance of investments, provided the proper environmental 
regulatory frameworks are in place in host countries (OECD 2002b). Focusing on technology transfer and 
change issues, the discussion below concentrates on FDI flows from OECD to developing countries to 
provide a context for understanding the potential influence of CDM in larger trends related to technology 
                                                     
9  See also a parallel paper by Philibert (2004) has a broader discussion on technology collaboration including a 
review of technology transfer and investment issues.  
COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)4/FINAL 
 14 
change over time.  It also considers flows of private investment compared to another source of foreign 
investment, that of  “Official Development Assistance.”  
Within the foreign capital going to developing countries, private flows only became a dominant element in 
the 1990s, while public flows remained relatively stable in absolute terms over this period.10 FDI tends to 
rise and fall with the financial cycles of the market and is risk averse compared to ODA. The downward 
decline in bank lending and FDI across developing countries in the late 1990s and in the early part of the 
current decade shows the effects of the east Asian financial market and the currency crisis in some Latin 
American countries. By comparison, between 1980 and 2002, ODA remained a more stable source of 
foreign capital for development across all developing countries (Figure 1), however its importance relative 
to other sources of capital varies widely by country.  
 
Table 1:  Foreign investment flows from OECD countries to developing countries  
public and private sources  
(1980 and 2002; million USD current year figures) 






 1980 2002 1980 2002 1980 2002 1980 2002 1980 2002 
Africa 10510 22285 2124 1877 1433 1839 6054 -1919 20121 24082 
Asia 13630 19143 3105 -7503 -660 15553 1365 -12068 17440 15125 
America 2259 5112 3191 -23 7269 15433 10657 -12394 23376 8128 
Europe 1200 5508 1063 1151 815 2934 4597 -2163 7675 7430 
Oceania 1024 709 63 -4 59 -36 3 966 1150 1635 
Unspecified 4971 9201 611 1012 1982 14121 5711 758 13275 25092 
Total by source 33594 61958 10157 -3490 10898 49845 28388 -26820 83037 81493 
Source:  OECD DAC - Creditor Reporting System 2004 
Notes:  To allow for comparability between public and private flows, these data are for investment flows from 
OECD Development Assistance Committee “donor” countries only, thus excluding a handful of OECD 
countries that are not DAC donors.  They also exclude flows of investment between developing countries i.e. 
roughly half of foreign direct investment flows inn 2002 were between developing countries.  
Though the total flow of ODA is less than total private flows, it remains the dominant source of foreign 
investment in many of the poorest developing countries. For example, in 2002, ODA to Africa was more 
than ten times the amount of FDI. However, FDI flows are larger relative to development assistance in the 
relatively industrialised or medium income regions such as Asia and Central and Latin America (Table 1). 
Table 1 also shows the large shifts that have occurred since 1980, when all investment flows were positive, 
compared to 2002 when repayment of debt and other concessional financing in some regions considerably 
offsets the more stable ODA source.   
A small, but significant portion of the total ODA to developing countries goes to economic infrastructure.  
Over the period 1980 to 2002, it was roughly 20% of ODA, with this share dropping to only 6% in 2002.   
Transport and energy infrastructure are the largest shares, representing about 50% and 40% respectively of 
share of ODA going to economic infrastructure in 2002.   
 
                                                     
10 Relative to gross domestic product in OECD countries (the donors), ODA was declining in this period, with a slight 
upturn in 2002 (OECD 2003b).   
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Source: CRS database, 2004 
Note:  The selected countries correspond to those that have been the most active in CDM (see Section 3) 
 
Figure 2 shows flows of investment from FDI and ODA sources for ten developing countries that have 
been the most active in CDM project development (see Section 3). In 2002, FDI played the strongest role 
in almost all of these countries, indicating a possible relationship between the types of enabling conditions 
that attract FDI and the ability to succeed in the establishment and use of a “CDM” type mechanism. 
However, ODA is still significant in absolute and relative terms in China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Peru.   
Another source of finance for climate-friendly technology change is the Global Environmental Facility.  
The Global Environmental Facility portfolio for climate change investments totalled $138.4 million in 
2002 (Figure 3); between 1991 and 2002, GEF portfolio for climate investments equalled $1.4 billion. This 
is but a small fraction of the flows from ODA and FDI, outlined above. However, like CDM investment, it 
has significant leveraging power and is estimated to stimulate at least four times more investment capital 
through co-financing (GEF 2003). GEF financing is also significant because it is targeted to climate change 
activities, with the vast majority of the funding going to mitigation technologies, including renewable 




Figure 3:  GEF portfolio investments in climate change (2002) 













2.2 Different means and mechanisms for technology transfer 
Several different means exist for a firm to transfer technology outside its host country (OECD 2002a; Metz 
et al. 2000) and many of these means operate through private investment channels. For example, trade, 
technology licensing and foreign direct investment are all parallel pathways for a firm to transfer 
technology.  OECD (2002a) suggests that foreign direct investment is the most important means of 
technology transfer to developing countries. Working through multinational enterprises (MNE) in 
developing countries, FDI may have a number of unique advantages compared to other means of 
technology transfer:  
• ability to promote the transfer of the management and technical “know-how” needed to accompany 
successful technology transfer as well as focus on an explicit transfer of hard technology; 
• forcing innovation in domestic firms that would not otherwise occur; 
• bringing in new, higher technology options that may not be otherwise available locally but rather 
exist only in the multinational enterprise; 
• scale economics, marketing skills and other features of MNEs may give them the competitive edge  
to more profitably exploit a particular technology compared to local firms, making that technology 
less costly and more valuable in that particular market. 11 
A number of different channels for technology transfer through FDI exist. This includes vertical linkages, 
where MNEs transfer technology and know-how to other firms with which they are working in the 
developing country, i.e. buyers or suppliers of intermediate products. Horizontal linkages provide a second 
channel, where local firms in the same industry adopt technology through imitation or from innovation 
stimulated by competition.   Labour migration is another channel, where workers trained by the MNE with 
higher technical capacity move on to other local firms and transfer their knowledge.  The fourth and final 
channel is international R&D, where multinational enterprises (MNEs) may conduct research locally to 
build knowledge about new technologies or processes.  Empirical evidence indicates, however, that this 
last channel is relatively limited, as a large majority of R&D carried out by MNEs is conducted in home 
countries rather than oversees (OECD 2002a).   
                                                     
11 Of course, where local skills and capabilities are high, technology transfer through FDI may be more rather than 
less costly compared to another alternative -- the licensing agreement. 
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How do the various features of FDI with respect to technology transfer relate to the discussion about 
CDM? Where FDI is a main source of investment in CDM, there may already be an open opportunity to 
contribute to technology transfer. In addition, the features noted above may also be useful ways to review 
whether proposed CDM projects are achieving conditions conducive to technology transfer. 
The potentially large technology spillover effects from FDI in developing countries suggest that FDI trends 
may be particularly important for GHG mitigation – that is, to influence new technology investment toward 
low- or no-emission options. Empirical evidence is less clear, however, on whether these technology 
spillovers are environmentally positive (Metz et al. 2000; OECD 2002a; OECD 2001).  
In theory, FDI, and MNE operations more generally, can provide access to newer, cleaner technologies as 
well as to cutting-edge knowledge about environmental performance in a particular industry.  More 
intangible factors, such as improved corporate image abroad and at home, may also play a role. In practice, 
a number of other factors will also influence the environmental performance of MNE operations abroad, 
including environmental regulations in host countries and which industrial activity is undertaken.   If FDI 
in some developing countries is flowing largely to resource-intensive activities, these may have high 
environmental impacts. The main question with respect to the environmental performance of FDI is 
whether such investments perform better, worse or equivalent to that of similar investments/industrial 
activities in the home country of the investing corporation.   A recent trend in FDI is that it has been 
flowing to service sector investments rather than to primary or secondary production activities, which will 
change the environmental profile of such investments (Heller and Shukla 2003).  
As noted above, FDI from one developing country to another is significant and it has increased 
dramatically in the last few years, raising the potential for “South-South” knowledge and technology 
transfers to occur. However there is little empirical analysis on how well South-South investments, which 
are often from a relatively wealthy developing country to a poorer country, are performing with respect to  
the environment and technology transfer (Christiansen 2004).   
The IPCC’s review of the literature concluded that environment-FDI linkages were weak and that it was 
best to avoid sweeping generalisations (IPCC 2000).  The empirical evidence is mixed and debate 
continues about whether FDI encourage pollution “havens” by encouraging a lowering of environmental 
standards at the national level so as to attract more FDI, or create pollution “halos” through MNE good-
practices (OECD 2001; OECD 2002b). However, a strong conclusion cutting across most assessments is 
that host country environmental policies are a necessary safeguard to provide incentives for improvements 
in environmental performance of FDI.  
There is broad agreement that two main avenues exist to improve the environmental performance of FDI.  
The first is through national environmental institutions, including the legal framework, as well as 
mechanisms, to ensure effective enforcement (OECD 2002b).  Ultimately, only the host government is in a 
position to ensure that direct incentives are in place to promote environmental performance through the use 
of clear national regulatory and institutional frameworks. The second avenue is through the propagation of 
firm-level good-practices, where multinational enterprises (MNE) may have corporate-wide policies that 
(voluntarily) support higher levels of performance based on home country practices. In this way, voluntary 
actions by MNEs can supplement formal regulations to promote good environmental performance.  The 
OECD Guidelines for MNEs are an example of efforts to move in this direction (OECD 2000).   
In addition to the question of environmental performance of FDI is the question of where it will flow and 
why. As highlighted above, recent trends show that FDI is a more stable source of investment for 
developing countries than other private flows that tend to be extremely sensitive to market fluctuations. 
However, the data also shows that FDI flows are selective – it will only flow to countries and locations 
where relatively strong “enabling conditions” for investment exist (OECD 2002a; OECD 2003).  These 
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include stable political regimes, strong legal environments for contracts and proven enforcement 
capabilities, macro-economic stability, availability of pools of skilled workers and other sources of human 
capital.  Since many of the poorest of developing countries do not have the basic “governance” conditions 
to attract FDI, ODA will remain a relatively more important source of financing for technology transfer in 
these countries for the foreseeable future (Metz et al. 2000; OECD 2002a).   Increasingly important to 
long-term development prospects is how to use ODA as a means to leverage FDI for development in 
developing countries, for example, through public-private partnerships to invest in human capital and 
infrastructure improvements (OECD 2003). 
2.3 How does CDM compare to other investment flows? 
The funds available to date for the CDM amount to more than $800m USD (section 3) and this amount is 
expected to be augmented especially by private sector flows in the coming years.  In addition, CDM 
financing can be used to leverage other investment. The World Bank indicates that carbon finance is 
between 1:6 to 1:8 of total project cost (Sinha 2004). If we take 1 billion USD as an estimate of the amount 
of financing available for CDM in the coming years, this would mean that the amounts of investment 
stimulated by a CDM mechanism could become significant, i.e. 6-8 billion USD.  Using the estimates 
developed recently by the IEA (2003) with respect to projected investment in energy infrastructure in 
developing countries in the 2001-2030 timeframe, this would represent about 1% of the required energy 
investment in developing countries’ electricity sector to 2010. However, this CDM-leveraged finance for 
the entire Kyoto period is equivalent to just over 10% of FDI and ODA flowing annually to developing 
countries, which stood at about $50 and 60 billion USD respectively in 2002. By comparison to GEF flows 
for climate change investments, which totalled about $1.4 billion over 1991 to 2002, the CDM is of at least 
a similar magnitude. 
 COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)4/FINAL 
 19 
3. REVIEWING PROGRESS WITH THE CDM 
A “gap” is projected between Annex I (developed) countries’ GHG emissions and emissions commitments. 
This has resulted in much interest from many Annex I and non-Annex I (developing) countries in 
participating voluntarily in the CDM.  Indeed, the CDM offers the opportunity for Annex I countries to 
meet their emission commitments at a lower cost, and for developing countries to attract new sources of 
finance and technology for activities which help sustainable development.  
While no CDM projects have yet been approved by the CDM EB, there has been progress towards 
implementing the CDM in the six years since it has been established. The achievements include 
development of on-the-ground projects and several more project proposals; development of CDM-related 
legislation and institutions; increased awareness of climate change, its mitigation measures and the cost of 
mitigation; and impetus for developing “carbon” funds, e.g. by the World Bank.   
Nevertheless, there are also significant barriers to developing CDM project activities. These include 
financial and institutional issues, risks and uncertainties associated with generating CERs, delays in 
approving CDM project activities and methodologies, and other barriers such as difficulties in matching 
potential projects with potential investors or barriers for investment by non-domestic entities.This section 
outlines the achievements of the CDM to date as well as barriers to developing CDM project activities.  
3.1 Development of concrete project activities 
More than 160 projects in 48 countries have been or are being developed as CDM project activities, with 
an estimated mitigation effect of almost 32 million tons CO2-eq/year during the first commitment period 
and at least a further 50 million credits prior to 2008. These activities are mainly emission-reduction 
projects, are implemented in different sectors and reduce emissions of a variety of GHG (CO2, CH4, N2O 
and HFCs). Information on only a few potential CDM “sinks” projects is available. No project activities 
have been proposed to date that reduce emissions of SF6 or of PFCs. Proposed project activities range from 
very small-scale projects with low projected emission reductions (< 100 t CO2-eq/y) to large-scale 
activities that are estimated to mitigate over 3 mt CO2-eq/y.  
Rapid changes have occurred in the project portfolio during 2003/04 with shifts in the relative importance 
of different countries and sectors. The project portfolio examined in the figures below (and detailed in 
Annex 1) includes information, where available, on projects planned, underway or for which a project idea 
note has been agreed between a project developer and potential CER-buyer. These figures give a general 
overview of the current project portfolio. However, one or two very large projects can change the picture 
significantly.  
Figure 4 outlines the varying importance of different host countries/regions in the CDM portfolio. Asia 
dominates in terms of the flow of expected credits (67% of the total) although more than half of the 
projects identified occur in Latin America. As was the case for projects registered under the pilot phase of 
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) under the UNFCCC, projects located in Africa represent a small share 
of the total however it is measured. No project activities to date are located in the Middle East, but two are 
located in Europe (Moldova). 
Examining which countries (rather than regions) CDM project activities occur in further highlights the 
unequal geographical spread of such activities. Four countries: India, Brazil China and Indonesia, are 
expected to generate 17.8 million certified emission reductions (CERs) per year during the first 























initiated are together expected to generate 14 million CERs in the same timeframe.  While CDM project 
activities are being planned or implemented in most Latin American countries (16 out of 19), similar 
activities are present in only 19 (out of 46) Asian countries12 and 9 (out of 54) African countries. Ten 
countries (India, Brazil, Indonesia, China, Korea, Vietnam, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Thailand) account for 
more than 80% of expected annual credits.  














  Percentage of annual credits      Number of project activities 
 
Sources: Project documentation detailed in Annex 1 detailed in Annex 1  
  
The relative mitigation potential of different countries is not reflected in their share of the current project 
portfolio. Indeed, although China has a mitigation potential estimated at 144 m CERs/y just for energy-
sector and gas flaring projects (Jotzo and Michaelowa 2002), Brazil currently accounts for more of the 
annual CER market even though its non-sink CDM potential has been estimated at <2% of that of China 
(Jotzo and Michaelowa 2002),. India, however, accounts for 23% of expected annual credits – with almost 
half of this coming from just one proposed project activity (F-gas decomposition in Gujarat). Although 
Costa Rica is a small country with a predominantly renewable energy electricity system, it is currently 
expecting to generate more CERs/y than Malaysia and the Philippines combined.  
Figure 5 shows the relative importance of different sectors for proposed emission-reduction CDM projects. 
Examining the number of projects initiated or the number of expected annual credits gives a very different 
picture. Almost three-quarters of the total number of project activities initiated focus on energy-sector 
initiatives – particularly electricity generation from renewable energy sources. However, these renewable 
electricity projects account for 37% of the expected emission credits. Conversely, the two F-gas 
decomposition projects account for 17% of the estimated annual generation of CERs. This disparity 
between the number of projects and number of credits generated is caused both by the gases reduced 
(HFC-23 has a global warming potential (GWP) of 11,700) as well as the size of the project (some energy-
sector projects are small-scale). 
It is also noteworthy that the relative importance of different sectors has changed rapidly over time. In 
particular, two very large projects that estimate reduction of HFCs to be more than one and three million 
                                                     
























CERs per year respectively were submitted to the UNFCCC in 2003 and account for 17% of credits 
expected to be generated during the first commitment period. Several landfill-gas or other methane-capture 
projects have also been developed relatively recently. These are often also relatively large in terms of 
estimated emission reductions because of methane’s GWP of 2113, and together account for 23% of the 
project portfolio. Given the low cost and large potential volume reductions in N2O emissions from adipic 
acid production in many developed countries over the 1990s and the high GWP of N2O, it would not be 
surprising if N2O-reduction projects were also to begin to be developed. In contrast, earlier projects, such 
as those developed by CERUPT as well as many of the early PCF projects, focus on energy sector projects 
that reduce emissions of CO2 and CH4.  
Figure 5: CDM portfolio – relative importance of different sectors  
  
 




Proportion of credits            Number of projects 
Sources: Project documentation detailed in Annex 1 
 
Clearly, the most popular project type is hydro-electricity, with other electricity generation (biomass and 
other renewables) making up the next two largest shares. Together, electricity generation makes up about 
two thirds of the number of projects, but only 38% of total credits / tons. Again, these results are shaped in 
part by the very large credits from two F-gas decomposition projects and several landfill gas projects. 
Figure 6 highlights the variation in project portfolio of different host countries. This figure also highlights 
the importance that a small number of large projects have on the national (and global) potential CDM 
project portfolio. The identified project portfolio of South Korea consists of just one project of F-gas 
decomposition, and the project portfolio of China is also dominated by an individual project: gas recovery 
from coal mines. Single projects in India (F-gas decomposition) and Indonesia (reduction of GHG from 
cement manufacture) are also very important in their country’s project portfolio. 
                                                     
13 Although not the most recent estimate of GWP, 21 is the GWP currently assigned to proposed CH4-reducing CDM 
project activities.  
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Figure 6. CDM Portfolios – Top 10 countries 
 
  Sources: Project documentation detailed in Annex 1 
   
Several potential CDM project activities to date have been developed as part of a national or international 
scheme or fund. Eligibility criteria for these different schemes can vary, and can affect the geographical 
spread, sector and size of projects developed. For example, the Finnish CDM/JI programme has to date 
focused on small-scale emission-reduction projects. The World Bank’s Community Development Carbon 
Fund (CDCF) also focuses on smaller-scale projects. Many CERUPT projects are energy-sector projects of 
both small and large-scale – several of which are located in Asia. Many of the earlier PCF projects are 
located in Latin America, although Asia is now becoming more important. Several feasibility studies for 
projects initiated by the Japanese government, as well as the PCF’s Plantar project, involve A/R project 
activities. The two F-gas decomposition projects also both have Japanese involvement. 
As well as the project activities identified above, several more are in development. These include project 
activities proposed to e.g. INCaF (the Dutch carbon fund at the IFC), the Netherlands Clean Development 
Facility at the World Bank, or the Japanese, Swedish or Italian governments. However, information on 
many of these (and other project activities under development) it is difficult to obtain before they are 
submitted to the CDM EB. Thus, it is difficult to estimate what proportion of the CDM portfolio under 
development is “visible”.  
However, recent documentation suggests that the shift in project sectors, particularly away from renewable 
energy projects, is set to continue. For example, the project portfolio in Guatemala is shifting from one 
focused on renewable energy projects to including projects in the forestry and industry sectors (Alvarez 
2003). The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Clean Development Mechanism Facility has a project 
pipeline that includes methane reduction from coal-beds and sanitary landfills as well as energy-sector 
(including renewable energy) projects (ADB 2003). Moreover, there is increasing interest in the CDM 
from project types currently or until recently absent from the project portfolio, e.g. natural-gas fired power 
plants and F-gas decomposition.  These project types – particularly F-gas reduction - have the potential to 









































































3.2 Developing CDM-related institutions and legislation 
In order to be able to participate in the CDM, and therefore benefit from i.a. enhanced inward investment 
and/or generation of cost-efficient credits, both national and international institutions are needed. The 
CDM Executive Board (EB) is the CDM’s international supervisory body and was established by the 
Marrakech Accords in November 2001. It is composed of 10 members and 10 “alternates” from non-
Annex I and Annex I Parties. There are also three international advisory panels established by the EB on 
different issues:  
1. Simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale project activities (now disbanded); 
2. Guidance on baseline and monitoring methodologies (the “Methodology Panel”); and 
3. Accreditation of operational entities (the “Accreditation Panel”). 
The Marrakech Accords indicate that “Parties participating in the CDM shall designate a national authority 
for the CDM”. This “Designated National Authority” (DNA) needs to provide written approval of a Party’s 
participation in a particular CDM project activity, and – for host countries – confirm that the project 
activity assists it in achieving sustainable development.  Thus, potential project participants and investors 
need DNA approval of their proposed project activity before it can generate emissions credits.  
This requirement for project approval by the host country government means that some institutional 
capacity is needed at the national level, even if the CDM project participants are in the private sector. 
Project investors also need to be sure that host country legislation allows transfer of CERs to them. Thus, 
as well as the institutional structure needed for CDM project approval, new or amended legislation may 
also be needed to lay the groundwork for CDM project activity development. For example, work is 
underway in Bolivia and Ecuador to evaluate legal aspects relating to CERs (Jáuregui 2003, Castro 2003). 
Changes to current legislation in order to establish a suitable framework for the CDM is also in progress in 
Vietnam (Phung and Hieu, 2002). 
The Marrakech Accords also outline the process of developing and approving a CDM project. This  
involves several different actors, including the project participants, designated operational entity, the CDM 
EB and stakeholders. Figure 7 outlines this process for a project activity proposing a new baseline and 
monitoring methodology.  
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 Source: adapted from UNFCCC (2003) 
3.2.1 Growth in national CDM-related institutions 
National-level CDM institutions have grown very rapidly since the establishment of the CDM EB in 
November 2001.  
By May 2004, 57 countries had designated a DNA, as had the European Community (EC)14. 48 non-Annex 
I countries have DNAs, and so do 9 Annex I Parties (including the EC). Almost all of these DNAs are co-
located in the national Environment Ministry or Agency. Many DNAs also include representation by (or 
co-ordination with) other government ministries, and some also include representation or input from other 
groups, such as NGOs.   
Work on establishing the roles and responsibilities of the DNA has started in many more countries, e.g. 
China and South Africa. However, several countries active as either potential CDM hosts (e.g. Indonesia,  
the Philippines) or as direct or indirect investors (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Spain) have yet to notify the 
UNFCCC of their DNA.  
DNAs can have several functions as well as that of evaluating and approving proposed CDM projects. 
Some of these functions are outlined in Table 2. These include CDM information dissemination and 
capacity building amongst local potential hosts and financiers; technical assessment of proposed projects; 
outreach to promote CDM investment in the country. DNAs, or the Ministries in which they are located, 
can also work to set an enabling environment (such as an appropriate legal framework) for CDM within the 
country.  
                                                     
14 An up-to-date list of DNAs is available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA . 
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Bangladesh    X (LFG)    X (criteria 
under devt.) 
China X  X X (indirectly)  (indirectly) X 
Guatemala X     X X X 
Indonesia * 
(proposed) 
X    X X  X 
Mozambique   X  X X  (Not yet 
developed) 
Nicaragua    X X  X? X 
Peru X X X    X  
Sources: Guatemala, Alvarez 2003; Indonesia, Bratasida 2003; Mozambique, Saidé 2003, Nicaragua, Stadthagen 2003; Peru, 
Cigarán 2003, China, Lu 2003; Bangladesh, Reazzudin and Sinha 2003. 
 
Some countries simply designate an existing government official to carry host country approval and rely on 
consultants (often Annex I) to carry out any technical work. However, other DNAs are more proactive. For 
example, depending on the institutional set-up within the country, DNAs can also help in formulating the 
national CDM policy and any criteria used to judge proposed projects, such as particular sustainable 
development indicators and/or preferred (or non-eligible) project types. Indeed, some DNAs – both 
potential investors and hosts – have outlined preferred project types or characteristics. For example, China 
has indicated that priority will be given to energy-sector and CH4-capture project activities that “shall bring 
about GHG emission reductions, shall bring additional financial resources [and] shall bring technology 
transfer” (Lu 2003). India has developed a series of interim criteria on project eligibility, financial 
indicators and technological feasibility as well as sustainable development indicators that “should be 
considered” when developing a CDM project activity (MOEF 2002). Costa Rica’s DNA was originally set 
up under the AIJ pilot phase, and had then set up general criteria, including sustainable development 
criteria, for project approval.  
3.2.2 Barriers to developing efficient DNAs 
Some countries have experienced difficulties in setting up their DNAs, including constraints in the supply 
of financial and personnel resources. Since governance structures and responsibilities are different in 
different countries, effective DNA structures are also likely to vary (see e.g. CAEMA/DFAIT 2003, 
Jaurégui 2003, Bratasida 2003). This limits the possibilities for countries who have not yet developed a 
DNA to replicate the structure of one already in place. It takes time to set up an appropriate structure and 
membership of a DNA. It can also take time to reach agreement within a country on the roles and 
responsibilities of each body (e.g. ministry) involved.  
Although “DNAs” are new, some of their potential functions are similar to that of “National Cleaner 
Production Centres” (NCPCs). For example, NCPCs functions include raising awareness, capacity 
building/training and “encouraging new and additional finance … and promoting environmentally-sound 
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technology cooperation” (UNEP 2003). NCPCs have been set up in several Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries, and suggestions on their structure, membership and functioning are available (UNEP 2003).  
Financial issues can hinder both the creation and continued operation of a DNA. This has been noted by 
several countries, e.g. Nicaragua (Stadthagen 2003), Cambodia15, as well as in several offices in Latin 
America (Morena et al. 2004). Financial barriers to establishing a DNA have been overcome in some 
countries with the input of international resources, e.g. from the Dutch government via UNEP’s “Capacity 
Development for the CDM” programme,16  from Japan (Fukushima 2003) and from the German 
International Cooperation Agency. Funding from external sources may also be needed to maintaining 
already-established DNAs, e.g. the World Bank and Latin American Carbon Program help fund activities 
of the Columbian DNA (CAEMA/DFAIT 2003).  
Expanding a DNA’s activities to include identifying potential CDM projects and making this information 
available to potential investors could help increase the financial viability of a DNA. However, it could also 
cause a conflict of interest if the same organisation is both identifying projects and providing host-country 
approval of these projects. This is because the interest of an investment promotion agency may be to 
maximize total investment, while the interest of a DNA should include checking the contribution to 
sustainable development.  The conflict is that one would seek to maximise the number of CDM-generated 
credits, while the other would only approve those CDM projects that really meet domestic criteria.  
Established project approval criteria and processes are also needed so that DNAs are set up in such a way 
as to avoid further delays in evaluating and approving a proposed project activity. The international process 
for approving proposed CDM project activities is already a lengthy process, particularly if a proposed 
project activity uses a new baseline or monitoring method. Existing national approval procedures can also 
be lengthy. For example, this step takes an average of 55 days in Bolivia (CAEMA/DFAIT 2003), up to 30 
working days to evaluate an expression of interest in Austria (AFEW 2003b) and up to four weeks in 
Denmark (DEA 2002). 
3.2.3 Growth in other CDM-relevant institutions 
Institutions other than those needed to approve potential CDM projects at a national and international level 
have also grown over the last few years. These include “carbon funds” set up to procure emission credits. 
Such funds are often located and run within international banks, such as the World Bank, International 
Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank, but also by national banks (e.g. Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation) and private-sector companies. 
Capacity to validate and verify CDM projects has also grown, with 20 companies applying to become a 
“designated operational entity” (DOE). However, 18 of these, including the first two to become DOEs, are 
located in Annex I countries with the remaining two located in Korea and Malaysia. Further development 
of DOEs, particularly in Latin America, would help to reduce verification costs, which increase with 
increasing distance between verifier and projects.  
Some potential CDM investors and/or the funds in which they invest carry out similar functions to some 
host-country DNAs. For example, they provide technical assessment of projects, can provide technical 
information related to a particular project, and may also indicate sustainable development indicators or 
outline a list of favoured project types or locations. For example, the developing KfW fund indicates that it 
will not purchase credits from large hydro or sink projects (Zander 2003). The Austrian JI/CDM 
                                                     
15 See http://www.camclimate.org.kh/camkyoprotocol/cdm.htm. 
16 See http://www.cd4cdm.org/ for up-to-date information. 
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programme outlines a list of preferred project types (AFEW 2003). The CDCF focuses on projects with a 
clear community benefit. The Italian Carbon Fund focuses on China, the Mediterranean region, Middle 
East and the Balkans (Pinna 2003). 
3.3 Defining guidelines for CDM project development 
The decisions governing CDM project activities agreed at COP7 (for emission reduction projects) and 
COP9 (for afforestation/reforestation projects) outline the general framework of the CDM, including its 
governance, and eligibility/participation requirements. These eligibility requirements allow for a large 
range of different CDM project activities. Indeed, as illustrated by the types of project activity submitted to 
the CDM EB, the CDM project portfolio already covers a wide variety of different project types and sizes. 
The agreements on the CDM at COP7 and COP9 also include very general guidance on how to determine 
“additionality” and establish a baseline for a project activity. Additionality is important as only 
“additional” CDM projects can get credits. The determination of whether or not a project activity is 
additional is the role of the EB, based on information from a project activity’s designated operational 
entity. Neither the Parties involved in a CDM project activity nor the project participants take this decision. 
General guidance on determining a project’s additionality has been established in the Marrakech Accords. 
The CDM EB has given further guidance on assessing additionality (UNFCCC 2003d and e). However, 
assessing additionality in practice has proved both difficult and contentious, with different stakeholders 
coming to opposite conclusions about the additionality of particular projects (e.g. CDMWatch 2003). This 
approval process could also be difficult for the Parties involved, as it could result in a “loss of face” if they 
approve a project only to have it subsequently, and publicly, rejected by the CDM EB. 
The decisions at COP7 and COP9 also outline that the emission benefits of a CDM project are assessed by 
comparing emissions (or sequestration) from a project with those of its baseline. A baseline is defined as 
“the scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that 
would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity.” The Marrakech Accords outlines three 
general “approaches” that can be used to develop “baseline methodologies”17.  
Different project types need to take different aspects into account when establishing a baseline. For 
example, the current and expected GHG-intensity of electricity generation is a key factor for electricity-
generating projects, the number of hours/year equipment is used is key to determining the emission 
benefits of an energy-efficiency projects. For landfill projects, the current practice of landfill gas capture at 
a particular site is important in determining baseline emissions. Different project contexts, including 
national circumstances of host countries, will also influence the baseline.  
At one stage the development of detailed top-down guidance on baselines was envisaged, referred to before 
COP6 as the CDM “reference manual” (UNFCCC 2000). However, developing such technical guidance 
during negotiations would have been challenging. Thus, in the end, it was decided that guidance on 
baselines, additionality and monitoring for most CDM projects should be approved by the CDM EB 
following a bottom-up “case law” approach. The exceptions are the pre-approved methods for small-scale 
projects, adopted at COP8 for emission-reduction projects and to be developed for small-scale 
re/afforestation projects. 
                                                     
17 These approaches are “a) existing actual or historical emissions… b) emissions from a technology that represents 
an economically attractive course of action, taking into account barriers to investment, or c) the average emissions of 
similar project activities undertaken in the previous five years, in similar… circumstances and whose performance is 
among the top 20 per cent of their category”. 
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To date, detailed, approved, guidance for selected CDM project activities is available for the following 
project activities: 
• 1318 types of small-scale emission reduction CDM (SSC) project activities, including for grid and off-
grid renewable electricity projects, energy efficiency projects, thermal energy use, supply-side energy 
efficiency improvements, methane recovery (UNFCCC 2003c) 
• 11 types of larger-scale emission reduction CDM project activities that generate emission reductions 
from renewable electricity generation, fuel-switch projects, landfill gas capture, fuel switching and F-
gas decomposition. A further three methodologies (on fuel switching, steam system efficiency 
improvements and methane capture from swine manure treatment) have been recommended for EB 
approval by the Methodology Panel. 
Together, the SSC methods approved at COP8 and the EB-approved methods during 2003/2004 cover 
almost a third of the estimated emission reductions from currently-planned CDM projects. 
However, developing a methodology that is approved by the EB can take a significant amount of time and 
money.  Indeed, the minimum length of time to approve a new methodology has been 3 months (UNFCCC 
2003f). This delay is partly because bodies involved in its approval (i.e. the EB and the Methodology 
Panel) only meet sporadically. However, many proposed methodologies have been incomplete (e.g. lacking 
procedures to assess whether or not a proposed project is the baseline scenario) or need other revisions. 
Requiring revisions of the methodology by the project participant and re-submission to the MP/EB further 
delays the process, for example, the first “new methodology” proposed (for the Vale de Rosário bagasse 
co-generation project in Brazil) was approved two revisions and almost 8 months after its initial 
submission. The number and timing of deadlines for new methodology reviews, EB and Methodology 
Panel meetings has also meant that not all new baseline and monitoring methods submitted (e.g. that for 
the Zafarana wind project) have been reviewed by the EB within the four month timeline stipulated by the 
Marrakech Accords.  
3.4 Financing GHG-mitigation projects 
There are costs and risks associated with developing any type of project. However, certain costs and risks  
are peculiar to CDM project development, such as establishing emission baselines and approval by a DNA 
and the CDM EB. The transaction costs associated with developing CDM projects often occur up-front and 
can be significant.  
CDM projects also offer a unique set of benefits. One of the main benefits of developing a project as a 
CDM project is that it could generate a stream of emission credits, and therefore revenue, for up to 21 
years for emission-reduction projects and up to 60 years (for re/afforestation projects). This revenue stream 
provides an added economic incentive to undertake projects that contribute both to mitigating GHG 
emissions and to sustainable development. However, this incentive is not as high as originally anticipated, 
as the expected price for GHG credits in the first commitment period is likely to be low (e.g. almost 10 
EUR/t CO2-eq (Buen et al 2003) or $11.4/t CO2-eq (Haites 2004 forthcoming). For many CDM projects 
under development with an agreed emission reduction purchase agreement the price is even lower, ranging 
from EUR 2.47 to EUR 5.5 /ton CO2eq., e.g. from the PCF, CERUPT and the Finnish Government small-
scale project tender. CER prices vary according to project characteristics and risk distribution between 
CER-buyers and sellers. For CDM projects that do not yet have an agreed emission reduction purchase 
                                                     
18 In addition to the 12 project types detailed in UNFCCC 2003c, the 10th meeting of the Methodology Panel 
recommended EB approval of a methodology for methane avoidance projects. 
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agreement, the value of expected benefits is uncertain. Of course, a low expected price, or uncertainty in 
the value of the credit stream asset, provides a smaller incentive than a higher expected price.  
The financial profile of different types of CDM projects varies widely. This is in part linked to the project 
size and sector, and whether the project is “greenfield” (new) or “brownfield” (retrofit). Some common 
CDM project types, such as renewable electricity generation, typically have high capital costs – indeed, 
higher capital costs (but lower operating costs) than alternative fossil-fuelled technologies. They may also 
be perceived as risky investments if they rely on an intermittent energy source. So although in many 
countries such technologies are implemented in small numbers under business-as-usual, they are far from 
mainstream investments. These technologies may thus not necessarily be well known or understood by 
potential financiers. Such projects may therefore have difficulty in attracting sufficient investment capital 
whether or not they are developed as CDM projects. Wariness of financiers may be even more pronounced 
if the financial attractiveness of such projects is dependent on a potential revenue stream of GHG-credits.  
Nevertheless potential CDM projects such as renewable electricity systems do generate a product (in this 
case, renewable electricity) as well as a potential revenue stream. In contrast, some of the larger and more 
recent CDM projects being developed have completely different characteristics in that the CDM-related 
investment of a project produces no new output except (potentially) CERs. Examples of this type of project 
would be retrofitting HFC decomposition equipment to an already-functioning HFC plant, or capturing and 
flaring (not using) methane from landfills. 
The Kyoto Protocol allows for participation in the CDM by private entities, as well as by Parties. Several 
Annex I governments and companies, and some banks, have set up or contributed towards funds that aim 
to buy GHG-credits from CDM projects. Some Annex I governments have initiated tenders for CDM 
(and/or JI) projects. These funds often pay for emission credits from a project rather than the project itself, 
although some also allow for some up-front payment. One new scheme expects to provide equity for CDM 
projects.This section outlines the funding opportunities and barriers peculiar to CDM project development.  
3.4.1 Funding available for CDM (or CDM/JI) activities 
Expected demand for significant quantities of  CERs to meet Parties’ emission commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol has spurred funding in CDM-type projects directly and indirectly, e.g. via carbon  funds or 
tenders. Indeed, several public and private funds aiming to buy emission credits from CDM (and/or JI) 
projects have been set up in potential investor countries over the last few years (see Table 3). 
Together, these funds add up to more than $800m, to be invested in projects that both reduce GHG 
emissions and contribute to sustainable development. Although the majority of the funding sources above 
comes from publicly-funded sources, private-sector sources of finance are also involved, e.g. as for private-
sector “carbon funds”, such as the Spanish Carbon Fund. Sources of venture capital also exist – for 
example, Econergy are active in the CDM market, and have identified a large portfolio of potential CDM 
project activities in Latin America (Moscarella 2003), however, information on the importance of this 
source of financing is sketchy. The vast majority of the carbon funds focus on only the emission-reduction 
(or sink enhancement) component of the proposed project, and thus account for only a small component of 
total project costs. Thus, total investment in GHG-friendly projects will be much higher (see e.g. Sinha 
2004). Moreover, if proposed CDM projects submitted to the CDM EB are representative, a significant 
amount of this investment will be from the private sector. 
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Table 3: Selected CER/ERU procurement initiatives 
Scheme Coverage Involvement Amount 
Austria JI/CDM Austrian government EUR 72 m (2003-2006) 
BioCarbon Fund CDM/JI Interest from governments (e.g. Canada) and 
companies. 
$30-$50m 
CDCF CDM 4 governments (Austria, Canada, Italy, 
Netherlands) and 7 companies (Japanese, German, 
Spanish, Swiss) 
$40-70m  
CERUPT CDM Dutch government EUR 32.5 m 
Denmark JI/CDM Danish government EUR 120 m to 2007 
Finland CDM/JI Finnish government EUR 10m 
Germany JI/CDM KfW (Federal government and states) EUR 25m (to EUR 50m) 
INCaF CDM Dutch government  EUR 44 m 
Italian Carbon Fund JI/CDM Italian government (also open to contributions from 
Italian companies) 
$20m (target $80m) 
Japan carbon fund CDM/JI JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) 
and DBJ (Development Bank of Japan) 
EUR 31.3m + EUR 23.5m 
NCDF CDM Dutch government $120-160m (32 mt CO2-
eq.) 
PCF JI/CDM 6 governments (Canada, Finland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation) and 17 companies 
$180m 
Sweden (SICLIP) JI/CDM Swedish government EUR 15m 
Sources: Pointcarbon November 2003, World Bank (undated) and Pinna 2003, Halich 2003, Sinha 2004, Mulders 
2004, Bostrom 2004 
CDM projects generate a stream of credits once the project is approved and implemented. Several funding 
schemes (e.g. INCaF, CERUPT, KfW) plan to purchase these credits only once they have been verified (or 
issued). This protects the buyer from some (but not all) of the risks associated specifically with developing 
a CDM project, including Parties’ non-approval of the project or non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as 
well as risks associated with the CDM-component of project design such as baselines and additionality19. 
Thus, for “carbon fund” type financing, there may be a considerable delay (several years) between project 
investors incurring CDM-related capital expenditures and receiving the CDM-related benefits.  
                                                     
19 Of course, CDM projects are also subject to “normal” project risks, including political/country risks, natural 
disasters, risk of non-construction/completion of project, financial or legal risks, operational risks. 
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Obtaining an emissions reduction purchase agreement for a proposed CDM project does not in itself reduce 
the need for capital investment in the project. However, agreeing a forward emissions purchase contract, 
e.g. an ERPA from a carbon fund, can facilitate a project developer in obtaining the financing required. 
This is because a project incorporating CER revenue will have a higher internal rate of return (IRR) than a 
similar project not developed as a CDM activity. For example, the WB indicate that at $3/t CO2, credit 
revenues could increase the IRR of hydro projects by 0.8-2.6%, wind projects by 1-1.3%, bagasse projects 
by 0.4-3.6% and biomass power projects that also reduce methane emissions by 2-7% (Heister 2002). Even 
in countries with coal-intensive electricity baselines such as India and South Africa, the IRR of wind 
projects are only expected to be boosted 1.5% (at $5/t CO2) and 2-3% (at $20/t CO2) respectively 
(Bhandari 2002, Spalding-Fecher et al. 2001). This CER revenue will also be in the form of “hard 
currency”. Moreover, financiers may be more willing to lend money to e.g. a proposed CDM project if one 
of the project participants is the World Bank or other carbon fund manager.20  
Obtaining up-front funding from a potential buyer of CERs reduces the requirement for capital investment 
from other sources, and can therefore facilitate financial closure of a proposed project. However, obtaining 
up-front investment from CER-buyers is rare, as these focus more on guaranteeing a revenue stream for 
project-generated credits rather than (co-)financing the project itself. Nevertheless, limited up-front 
funding may be available in some programmes for selected projects. For example, the Austrian JI/CDM 
programme allows for payment of up to 30% of the CER contract value (AFEW 2003b) and subsidies of a 
third of the additional costs of emission-reducing equipment are available from the Japanese government in 
return for a third of the CDM credits (MoE 2003). The recently-established Climate Investment Partnership 
also plans to provide both equity and debt for CER-generating projects (Joshua 2003).  
3.4.2 CDM-related transaction costs 
Transaction costs related to CDM projects occur at the national level, e.g. to establish and maintain a DNA, 
and at the project level. For proposed CDM projects, CDM-related transaction costs occur both before and 
during a project’s implementation. Estimates for the different transaction costs incurred prior to project 
implementation are shown for “regular” projects (i.e. projects that do not qualify for the simplified 
modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM projects) in Table 4, below.  
These transaction costs of up to almost 270,000 USD constitute a big barrier to developing CDM projects – 
particularly for potential projects that are already capital-intensive and/or that have difficulty in raising 
project finance, and that are not developed as part of a carbon fund. The important transaction cost barrier 
has been widely noted by project developers/DNAs (e.g. Hatano 2002, Stadthagen 2003, Maulidia 2003) 
even though some support for project design, development of PDD etc. is available from potential investor 
Parties, e.g. Canada, Denmark21 and Japan. 
Even the lowest estimate of transaction costs means that a project will need to generate approximately 
10,000 CERs over its crediting lifetime just in order to break even. Despite the establishment of pre-
approved baseline methodologies and other simplifications for small-scale CDM emission reduction 
projects, the transaction costs for these projects are also projected to be significant. These have been 
estimated at 23-78,000 USD (de Gouvello and Coto, 2003) or 110,000 USD (World Bank 2003). 
                                                     
20 There are also cases where different parts of one lending organisation fund different aspects of the same project. 
For example, a proposed bagasse co-generation CDM project has obtained debt financing from the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) as well as an ERPA from the IFC’s Netherlands Carbon Facility (Halich 2003). 




Table 4: Estimates of pre-implementation transaction costs for CDM projects  
 WB “regular” 
projects” 1 (000$) 
HWWA2        
(000$) 
Danish Energy 
Authority3  (000 EUR) 
Project search, preparation, feasibility study  40 19-29 20-50 
Negotiating ERPA 50 10.5 -- 
Developing baseline, monitoring plan, PDD 40 6.5-120 (not estimated) 
Consultation and Project appraisal 105 -- 5-40 
Validation 30 6-80 5-25 
Registration -- 5-30 (not estimated) 
Total 265 47-269.5 30-115 
Sources: 1 World Bank 2003, 2 Krey 2003, 3 DEA 2002 
3.5 Sustainable development aspects of CDM projects 
The host country government has the prerogative to decide whether or not a proposed CDM project activity 
helps it in achieving sustainable development. Some potential CDM host countries have established 
sustainable development criteria to be used to assess CDM projects. Unsurprisingly, these vary – as do host 
countries’ national circumstances and development priorities. 
This variation in host country criteria for approving proposed CDM projects has therefore led to 
differences in the sustainable development aspects of CDM projects underway or in development. Some 
project types, such as renewable electricity generation, can have clear positive effects on local 
environmental pollution, economic development and employment – while also reducing emissions of 
GHG. Several different project types in other sectors can also have significant sustainable development 
benefits. For example, CH4 capture can reduce the smell and risks of explosions near landfill sites. 
Increased use of waste fuels as a fuel in cement factories can lead to reduced landfills/incineration of waste 
(as well as reduced use of fossil fuels). Advanced manure management systems can lead to increased 
employment and reduced risk of groundwater contamination. Energy-efficiency systems can also reduce 
water pressures (e.g. by reducing leaks of steam).  
Nevertheless, a large and rapidly growing portion of the CDM project portfolio has few direct 
environmental, economic or social effects other than GHG mitigation, and produces few outputs other than 
emissions credits.  These project types generally involve an incremental investment to an already-existing 
system in order to reduce emissions of a waste stream of GHG (e.g. F-gases or CH4) without increasing 
other outputs of the system. 
3.6 Lessons learned from the CDM 
Although there are as yet no officially-approved CDM projects, there is enough experience with 
developing CDM projects, institutions and markets to be able to draw some lessons that could be useful for 
the future – either of the CDM or of a different project-based mechanism under a different climate regime. 
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There is wide coverage of proposed CDM project activities, highlighting that the potential for cost-
effective GHG mitigation activities is widespread – both in terms of gases and sectors targeted, and 
countries in which proposed activities occur. However, the majority of CDM investment is focused on just 
a few countries, and on three project types: renewable electricity generation (particularly from bagasse and 
biomass), decomposition of HFCs and reduction of CH4 emissions from landfills or coalmines. 
Significant flows of money have been directed towards CDM-related projects, programmes and funds. 
This review identifies at least $800m which will be dedicated to CDM projects in the coming years. 
However, this generally accounts for a small proportion of expenditure on a project and is estimated to 
leverage 6-8 times more investment in GHG-friendly equipment and systems, i.e. up to $6-8 billion over 
the Kyoto commitment period. Moreover, this level of investment is not enough to tap the full potential of 
CDM activities. For example, in order to meet electricity demand growth, more than $500 billion needs to 
be invested in electricity generating capacity alone in developing countries over 2001-2010 (IEA 2003).  
The majority of CDM investments and projects known today are planned in countries that already 
attract large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). As a motor for technology transfer and change 
and an indicator of the location’s desirability for foreign investors, the conditions for a strong presence of 
FDI may be similar to conditions that will support CDM investments as well as effective national CDM 
institutions.  Also as CDM may add to or influence FDI flows towards climate-friendly technology 
transfer, which could lead to lasting benefits.  
Much of the CDM-related funding to date has been from public funds (i.e. Annex I governments), 
although companies are also contributing to centralised carbon funds. Moreover, both companies from 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries are investing in potential CDM projects. Companies’ involvement can 
be expected to increase once Annex I companies in EU countries have received their credit allocation 
under the EU emissions trading scheme, and therefore have a clearer idea of their own emissions 
commitments and gap. Increased private participation may also occur once more top-down guidance (e.g. 
on baselines and additionality) has been agreed, as this reduces the transaction costs, risks and delays 
associated with CDM project development.  
The effect of the CDM during the first commitment period is likely to be small compared either to the 
“gap” between expected Annex I Parties’ GHG emissions (with current climate policies) and their 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol or to the technical and economic potential of the CDM to mitigate 
GHG emissions. However, CDM project activities can potentially stimulate lasting technology transfer and 
thus long-term climate change benefits.  
Prices for CERs are relatively low, but vary according to project characteristics and risks. Available 
ERPAs indicate a price range of EUR 2.5 – 6 per CER for different project types, with a premium being 
paid for renewable energy projects and/or projects with obvious community or sustainable development 
aspects.  However, even prices at the higher end of the range provide only limited economic incentives to 
capital-intensive project types. Thus, at present there is no single “CER” price, but a range. Moreover, 
prices for credits where the project registration risk is borne by the buyer tend to be lower (averaging 
$3.51/t CO2-eq. in 2003) than where this risk is borne by the seller, where prices averaged $4.88/t CO2-eq. 
in 2003 (Lecocq and Capoor 2003). Prices for the (temporary) credits from sink enhancement projects are 
likely to be lower than those for the (permanent) emission-reduction projects.  
 Lack of detailed up-front rules governing the CDM’s functioning has led to significant delays, and a 
“case law” approach to establishing guidance, e.g. for baseline methods (see also Ellis 2003). These delays 
have reduced the likelihood of significant GHG mitigation between 2008-2012 from potential projects with 
long lead-times, such as new electricity generating plants and afforestation activities. This is exacerbated 
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by uncertainties over the post-2012 climate regime, as the value of credits generated post 2012 are highly 
uncertain.  
CDM-related transaction costs can be high, and are also a significant barrier. These costs are incurred 
both at a Party level (e.g. for establishing a DNA) and at the project level, as outlined above. Moreover, the 
majority of project-related transaction costs occur before the proposed project generates emissions credits. 
Thus, the transaction cost barrier is highest for the development of new, capital-intensive project activities.  
Uncertainties as to whether a proposed project will ultimately generate credits can also be high. These 
uncertainties are at both a national and international level. At the national level, it is the host country DNA 
that decides whether or not it will approve a proposed project. Such national approval is dependent on the 
host country’s CDM policy/criteria in general (which may not be available to potential project proponents) 
as well as its stance on a particular proposed CDM project activity. At the international level, it is the DOE 
and the CDM EB that have the mandate to make the final decision on a project’s “additionality” - rather 
than the project proponents or the Parties involved in a proposed CDM project. While there are advantages 
with this process, it also highlights the non-negligible risk that the proposed revenue flow generated by a 
project’s credits will not materialise. This puts the project developers in a difficult situation. Depending on 
how project developers choose to demonstrate a project’s additionality, they may need to show to the 
validator and the EB that the flow of credits are enough to influence a decision whether or not to go ahead 
with the project, but to financiers that the CER-associated revenue flow is not important enough to make or 
break the project’s economic viability.  
Even for projects that are approved as “additional”, the number of credits that a proposed project will 
generate is uncertain. For example, the project’s validator, verifier or the CDM EB, may alter the baseline 
initially used by the project participants, financiers and involved Parties, to calculate a project’s expected 
emission reductions. Indeed, requests by the EB to modify suggested first-of-a-kind methodologies are 
relatively common, and can result in substantial changes to a project’s baseline (and therefore it’s expected 
credit generation).  
The value of credits generated by a proposed project is also uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates 
for likely credit prices during the first commitment period (IETA/ADB 2003). Moreover, credit prices may 
fluctuate considerably during this time. This makes investing in CERs as a speculative commodity a risky 
business – although one that is being considered by some (Lauverjat, 2003). Moreover, fluctuations in the 
market value(s) of CERs will only affect the revenue stream from a project if they are traded on the CER 
market. If, alternatively, the potential buyer and seller of CERs have entered into an ERPA, the project 
developer has been shielded from the negative effects of lower-than-expected prices. For CERs that are to 
be retired, fluctuations in their theoretical value is less important. 
The sustainable development aspects of different project types vary widely. Some degree of variation is 
expected, and reflects different host country development and CDM priorities when approving projects. In 
particular, small-scale renewable energy and energy efficiency projects account for a shrinking proportion 
of the CDM project portfolio, whereas large-scale end-of-pipe projects e.g. in industry (that offer much 
cheaper emission reductions but less obvious non-GHG benefits) are growing rapidly. The current 
incentive structure for CDM only values the emission-reduction component of a proposed CDM project 
and international governance of the CDM, i.e. the CDM Executive Board and its panels also focus on 
assessing the GHG-component of proposed CDM projects. In contrast, the current structure of the CDM 
governance leaves assessment of the sustainable development benefits of a project as an issue of national 
sovereignty. 
Capacity and institutional issues are significant barriers to a more widespread use of the CDM. Some of 
these barriers, such as lack of capacity to identify and assess potential projects in host countries and lack of 
 COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2004)4/FINAL 
 35 
awareness of the CDM and its benefits amongst potential financiers, could be lowered in the current 
climate regime – with appropriate resource input. However, the institutional set-up and oversight of the 
CDM can be cumbersome and lengthy at a national and international level. The priority allocated to 
developing CDM projects and institutions within a potential host country can greatly facilitate CDM 
investments within a country – as illustrated by the relative importance in the project portfolio of smaller 
but proactive countries such as Costa Rica. 
Current institutional capacity between potential CDM host countries is uneven, and is likely to remain 
so. While developing countries that expect many projects may have already built up a dedicated institution, 
many African countries, for example, cannot risk large investments in institutional infrastructure. On the 
other hand, fairly significant capacity has been built particularly amongst those developing countries that 
most need to take some form of action beyond 2012 due to high absolute emissions or high emissions 
intensity, e.g. China, India, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Indonesia and Mexico, suggesting that it 





Cuts in emissions of greenhouse gases are needed in order to stabilise their atmospheric concentrations and 
to limit the pace and magnitude of climate change. Achieving emission reductions agreed by Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol is only a small first step in this direction, and in the longer-term 
mitigation efforts will be needed from all major emitting countries. The CDM was established under the 
Kyoto Protocol with the dual purposes of helping non-Annex I Parties to achieve sustainable development 
and Annex I Parties to reach their emission commitments. While individual CDM project activities 
displace (rather than reduce) GHG emissions, experience with implementing GHG-friendly project 
activities can help technology transfer and moves to a more GHG-friendly development pathway in the 
longer term. Achieving transfer of climate-friendly technology is essential if mitigation is to be extended 
successfully across the world in the coming decades. 
The success of the CDM will depend in part upon the amount of investment it is able to stimulate in GHG 
mitigation activities and on the other types of long-term benefits that such activities are able to deliver. To 
date, more than $800m has been allocated to carbon funds or CDM (or CDM/JI) programmes. These funds, 
mainly public, focus on providing a revenue stream for emission credits from a project, rather than 
providing up-front project finance. This $800m is a conservative figure as, in addition to participation in C-
funds or CDM projects from Annex I industries, private sources of funding for CDM project activities are 
also likely to be available.  Taking these other sources of CDM investment into account, CDM financing 
over the Kyoto period is likely to at least $1 billion.   
This flow of known CDM investment to date is small relative to other flows of foreign investment from 
developed countries to developing countries. For example, foreign direct investment from the private 
sector or official development assistance from the public sector equalled about $50 b and $60 b 
respectively in 2002. However, CDM funds may have the potential to leverage six to eight times their 
amount – or about 6-8 billion USD - of investment capital towards GHG mitigation activities. This 
compares favourably with the $1.4b GEF investment in climate change activities from 1991 to 2002, and 
thus the CDM is significant with respect to investment available for climate-friendly technology. Although 
flows of investment in CDM are only a small fraction of FDI and ODA flows in any particular year, it may 
stimulate or add to the ongoing FDI flows in a country. The CDM may thus be uniquely well placed to 
stimulate transfer of low- or no-GHG emitting technologies driven by the private sector. 
Although as yet there are no officially-registered CDM project activities, there have been several 
achievements of the CDM to date. These include increased implementation of climate-friendly projects, 
awareness and experience of climate change mitigation measures in developing countries, and increased 
institutional capacity to assess and develop climate mitigation projects. 
More than 160 CDM project activities are currently underway or planned in 48 countries and several 
different sectors. These project activities anticipate reducing greenhouse gas emissions by almost 32 mt 
CO2-eq/year (or more than Ireland’s CO2 emissions in 1990) during the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period.  
The spread of project activities and host countries is relatively wide. However, proposed CDM project 
activities are concentrated in a few countries, e.g. India, Brazil, China, and Indonesia. The countries 
expecting to generate the most credits from proposed CDM projects to date are also often countries that are 
recipients of a significant proportion of total flows of FDI. Many of the poorest nations that are unable to 
attract flows of FDI do also not appear to be attracting significant interest in investment in CDM projects.  
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CDM project activities proposed to date include project activities that reduce emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O 
and HFCs. These activities are concentrated in three sectors: renewable electricity generation, reduction of 
methane emissions and F-gas decomposition. Sinks projects and proposed projects in the transport sector 
account for only a small proportion of proposed CDM project activities. The ancillary benefits of these 
different project types vary significantly. Table 5 summarises some of the different characteristics of 
different project types as well as their reduction potential. It is notable that project types currently 
accounting for the largest proportion of the CDM project portfolio are not necessarily those that have the 
largest emission reduction potential or that generate the cheapest emission reductions. This is partly due to 
the initial preference for CO2-reducing project activities such as renewable electricity systems by some of 
the larger “early movers” in the CDM market. 
This preference is now changing, and more recent buyers in the carbon market appear to prefer investments 
in lower-cost GHG reductions rather than more capital-intensive energy technology options with long lead-
times. This development may be a sign that the market for GHG reductions is beginning to function as a 
true market. It may also be partly due to lower uncertainties in assessing baselines and additionality for 
end-of-pipe project types rather than for new energy technology types of projects. End-of-pipe options, 
such as methane gas capture or F-gas decomposition, are usually “brownfield” sites, and project developers 
can reasonably show that in the absence of requirements to the contrary, there is no incentive to make an 
investment to reduce emissions from current levels. The fact that these projects occur on “brownfield” 
sites, and therefore presumably have been operating for several years, may also help in financing such 
projects, as the potential project participants have already demonstrated their financial validity.  
The potential of low-cost options to generate large amounts of CERs is significant. For example, the 
potential for F-gas reduction has been estimated at almost 90m CERs/y in China alone (Lu 2004). The 
potential for CH4 reduction from landfills is also significant, and reduction of N2O from adipic acid 
production could also be very cost-effective. If these project types were widely used, they could dominate 
the market for CERs and significantly lower the market price. This would increase the barriers for potential 
CDM project such as renewable energy and energy-efficiency systems, which often deliver higher-cost 
emission reductions but also have a higher long-term value in terms of project replicability, reduction of 
local pollution, technology transfer benefits and other sustainable development benefits. 
The likely importance of CDM during the first commitment period depends on many factors, including the 
level of effort embodied in the emission commitments, the effects of domestic emission-reduction and 
sink-enhancement policies and measures in Annex I countries, as well as the potential to use emissions 
trading and joint implementation. Thus, the CDM is one of a basket of GHG-mitigation measures, and was 
not initiated with the aim that it should be the main focus of global mitigation efforts. However, the 
availability of climate-friendly technologies and the large projected growth in demand for goods and 
energy, including in non-Annex I countries, means that the potential to limit growth in GHG emissions is 

















































reductions (mt in 
2010 at $5/t CO2)* 
20.4 229.1 18.6 1.4 219.1 3.9 7.8 
Potential 
reductions (mt in 
2010 at $10/t 
CO2)* 
24.4 272.1 20.5 1.6 286.5 3.9 28.9 
Technology 
transfer potential 
H M-L L M M-H L n/a 
Cost of CERs L-H L-M Very Low L-H 
(depending 
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Sources: Project documentation detailed in Annex 1, author assessment, Cogen et al 2003, 3E project, * from Trexler 2004  
 
While a positive start, CDM activity will have to increase within the next few years in order for CDM 
credits to grow to the estimated size of the CDM market during the first commitment period, i.e. between 
50- to 500 mt CO2-eq per year (Grubb 2003). The institutional groundwork has already been laid in several 
countries, as evidenced by the rapid growth in numbers of designated national authorities (of which there 
were 57 by May 2004). Moreover, large expansions in CDM-related emission reductions are planned: 
some of the carbon funds or CDM/JI programmes have only recently been initiated and have not yet 
resulted in project development. Table 5 also highlights that significant further levels of emission 
reductions are both possible and feasible, particularly in energy efficiency and methane reduction projects. 
The question is how can this potential best be tapped during the first commitment period and afterwards, 
particularly when current prices of GHG credits from CDM projects are relatively low. These are often 
between $3-6/CER, with some developers paying premiums for particularly SD-friendly or low-risk 
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projects. This price level may not provide enough of a pull to invest in project types that have long lead-
times and are capital-intensive, and/or provide uncertain levels of credits. 
Increased CDM activity could be facilitated by certain changes in the national and international processes 
for developing, approving and validating CDM projects and their underlying methodologies. These 
changes could include actions to reduce the time and cost associated with developing CDM projects, as 
these can both be significant. For example, project development costs could be reduced by providing 
detailed “top-down” guidance on baselines. Work on this has recently started in the CDM EB’s 
Methodology Panel, which recommended to the CDM EB (in May 2004) a baseline and monitoring 
methodology to be used for landfill gas projects and another for grid-connected electricity projects. If the 
CDM EB approves these methodologies, which have a relatively broad applicability, it could reduce the 
time, cost and uncertainty currently involved with methodology development for two important sectors for 
CDM projects. Such work may also usefully be extended to projects in other sectors.  
Project search costs could be reduced by encouraging potential project participants in host countries to 
bring forward project ideas (e.g. to their DNA) and by facilitating initial technical appraisal in the host 
country or by using a “unilateral” CDM-type model. However, this could require significant institutional 
capacity in potential host countries and is also less likely to lead to technology transfer. Thus, it may not be 
widely applicable to non-Annex I countries, at least not those in early stages of development. Project 
validation costs could be reduced by encouraging the development of validators in CDM host countries. 
Looking further into the future to a post-2012 regime, the role that the CDM, or any project-based 
mechanism generating emission credits, could play depends on the architecture of and participation in 
mitigation commitments. In order to deliver emission benefits at a large enough scale to slow growth in 
global emissions, such a regime would clearly need to deliver deeper emission reductions than those 
foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol. Stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will only 
be possible if all major emitting countries take on some form of commitment over the next few decades to 
begin to curb and eventually reverse growth in global emissions. As part of a future climate regime, any 
project-based mechanism would sensibly build on the institutions developed and project-level experience 
gained by companies and countries currently implementing the CDM. Current investors in CDM projects 
do not have a clear signal on the need for (or value of) GHG credits post-2012, thus increasingly the focus 
of investments is on near-term, “brownfield” and low cost emission reductions. In addition, resolving the 
tension between global emission reductions and local benefits is a key challenge for the future which could 
help to build local support for global GHG mitigation through the CDM or a similar project-based 
mechanism.  All of these suggestions point to the valuable learning that is occurring through emerging 
experience with the CDM, pointing to lessons that will hopefully establish a knowledge base and a starting 




5. ANNEX 1:  LIST OF PROJECTS 
Project Country Expected credits 
(kt CO2/y) 
Expected credits pre-
2008 (ktons CO2 eq) 
Project type Source 
Olavarria Landfill Argentina 12,8 18,49 LFG capture 3 
Battery-powered vehicles Bangladesh 3,85  Transport 9 
Micro-hydro project Bhutan 0,5  Elec gen 14 
AyP gas plant Bolivia 35,3  Elec gen 17 
Vale de Rosário (NM1) Brazil 95,7 669,6 CHP 1 
Nova Gerar (landfill gas to 
energy) (NM5) 
Brazil 345 754,6 LFG capture 3 
Barreiro Brazil 35,31 154,5 Elec gen 3 
Plantar Brazil 811 2 852,6 A/R, avoided 
fuel switch 
11 
Aquarius hydroelectric project Brazil 14,9 36,0 Elec gen 3 
Salvador da Bahia (NM0004) Brazil 822 2 558,5 Elec gen 3 
Granja Becker (NM34) Brazil 5,24  Swine manure 1 
V&M (NM0029) Brazil 976 5 859 Avoided fuel 
switch 
3 
Biogas and biodiesel for power Brazil 3  Elec gen 9 
Biodiesel for transport Brazil 4 19,25 Transport 9 
Onyx Landfill gas recovery 
(NM21) 
Brazil 88,3 259,3 LFG capture 1 
MARCA Landfill Gas Brazil 231  LFG capture 3 
Lara landfill Brazil 664,00 1 941 Elec gen 3 
Energy efficiency Brazil 0,2  Elec gen 16 
PCH Passo do Meio (NM 51) Brazil 94,4 393,3 Elec gen 1 
The Metrogas Package 
Cogeneration Project (NM18) 
Chile 11,6 34,80 CHP 1 
Chacabuquito Chile 79,00 425 Elec gen 4 
N2O Removal Chile 285,6 1 428 N2O 10 
Guardia Vieja Chile 250 1 000 Elec gen 10 
Peralillio (NM22) Chile 117  Swine manure 1 
Planta Graneros (NM16) Chile 16,1 53,6 Fuel switch 1 
Metrogas pipeline rehabilitation 
(SSC) 
Chile 8,06 110,50 CH4 reduction 3 
Huitengxile China 60,02  Elec gen 11 
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Steam efficiency improvements 
(NM17) 
China 79,8 528,2 Energy 
efficiency 
1 
Coal-bed methane China 2900  CH4 reduction 4 
Run-of-river China 371,00  Elec gen 4 
La Vuelta and La Herradura 
Hydroelectric Project (NM20) 
Colombia 71,10 243,36 Elec gen 1 
Jepirachi (NM24) Colombia 37,85  Elec gen 1 
Rio Amoya Colombia 361 1 803 Elec gen 10 
Urban mass transportation 
system (TransMilienio) 
Colombia 437 602 Transport 1 
Furatena Columbia 11,9  Energy 
efficiency 
4 
SARET Rio Azul Costa Rica 78,6  Elec gen 11 
Biogas recovery Costa Rica 47  Biogas 5 
Umbrella Project -Vara Blanca Costa Rica 20,3 101,0 Elec gen 4 
Umbrella Project - Chorotega Costa Rica 18,73 93,2 Elec gen 4 
Umbrella Project - 
Hidroelectrica de Cote 
Costa Rica 11,98 62,4 Elec gen 4 
Rio General hydroelectric 
project 
Costa Rica 128 638,5 Elec gen 10 
Cartago (NM33) Costa Rica 63,2 133,8 Cement 1 
Sabanilla Ecuador 130,4 391,2 Elec gen 10 
Sibimbe Ecuador 68,4 271,0 Elec gen 1 
Guachala Ecuador 7,84  Elec gen 10 
Perlabí Ecuador 13,2  Elec gen 10 
Sigchos 1 Ecuador 130  Elec gen 10 
Salinas Ecuador 12  Elec gen 17 
Hidroelectrica Pilalo 3 Ecuador 74,1 222 Elec gen 10 
Zafarana (NM36) Egypt 227 455 Elec gen 1 
Electrica del Norte El Salvador 8 69,97 Elec gen 5 
Ingenio da Cabana El Salvador 24,74  Elec gen 10 
Valco Aluminium smelter 
efficiency  
Ghana 13  Elec gen 11 
El Canadá (NM6) Guatemala 144 577  1 
Hidroelectrica Candelaria 
hydroelectric project 
Guatemala 21  Elec gen 3 
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AHPPER Honduras 45  Elec gen 15 
Wind farm - Francisco Morazan Honduras 137,5 687 Elec gen 10 
Koppa (NM11) India 62,92 382 Elec gen 1 
Sankaneri Wind India 37,84  CHP 11 
Lucknow (ABIL) (NM32) India 101,9 155 Elec gen 1 
BCML Bagasse Cogeneration 
A43(NM30) 
India 95,2 365 Elec gen 1 
TA Sugars (NM35) India 584,00 1 374 CHP 1 
Raghu Rama (in Tamilnadu) 
(NM25) 
India 82,55 282 CHP 3 
Wind in Tamil Nadu India 36,8 177 Elec gen 19 
Solid Waste Management - 
Chennai 
India 234 184 Elec gen 10 
Ind-Barath India 42  Elec gen 11 
Kalpa Taru India 115  Elec gen 11 
FaL-G brick units India 387  Elec gen 4 
Balrampur biomass project India 46,8  Other 11 
Biomass gasifiers India 9,26 18,51 Elec gen 5 
Gujarat India 3380  Elec gen 11 
OSIL waste heat (NM31) India 29,53 288 F-gas 
decomposition 
1 
Agrinergy India 50  Waste heat 
recovery 
13 
Birla (NM45) India 917,3 1 225 Elec gen 1 
Karnataka wastewater 
(NM42,44) 
India 35,6 107 Cement 1 
Indo gulf (NM37) India 22,8 103 energy 
efficiency 
1 
SRS bagasse India 22  energy 
efficiency 
11 
Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Plant 
(NM 49) 
India 87,9 308 Elec gen 1 
Ethanol Fuel Production  India 38,9  Elec gen 7 
Off-season Bagasse 
Cogeneration 
India 734,00  Elec gen 4 
Indocement (NM 47, NM48) Indonesia 1045 1 373 CHP 1 
Lumut Balai Indonesia 730  Cement 6 
Rice Husk Power Indonesia 14  Elec gen 6 
Renewable agro-industry Indonesia 9  Elec gen 6 
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Micro-hydro project Indonesia 5,56  Elec gen 11 
Urban Buses in Yogyakarta Indonesia 2,1  Elec gen 6 
Unocal's Sarulla project Indonesia 692  Transport 6 
Palm oil waste power plant Indonesia 56,5  Elec gen 12 
Darajat Unit III Indonesia 780 84,75 Elec gen 1 
Reforestation project on Lombok Indonesia 27,7  Elec gen 7 
Forest Plantation - East 
Kalimantan 
Indonesia 68,4  Sequestration 7 
Carbonization and Power 
Generation -South Sumatra 
Indonesia 102,5  Elec gen 7 
Wigton (NM12) Jamaica 49,2 148 Elec gen 1 
NEDO Kazakhstan 62  Energy 
efficiency 
 
Smallholder Tea Kenya 54  Other 4 
Webuye Falls  Kenya 0,24  Elec gen 11 
Improved efficiency of 
transformers and motors  
Kenya 0,30  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
Efficient boilers and kiln  Kenya 119  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
New solar power Kiribati 1,656  Elec gen 7 
Ulsan (NM0007) Korea 1400 3 850 F-gas 
decomposition 
1 
Bumibiopower (NM39) Malaysia 24,53 73,59 Elec gen 3 
Kunak Palm oil mill  Malaysia 51,2 153,6 Elec gen 3 
Air Hitam landfill gas capture Malaysia 9,86  Elec gen 11 
Feldar Lepar Hilir (NM13) Malaysia 24,9 125,35 Palm Oil 7 
INELEC -El Gallo (NM23) Mexico 70,8 82,23 Elec gen 3 
INELEC - Benito Juarez Mexico 40,8 40,80 Elec gen 2 
INELEC - Chilatán Mexico 51,8 104 Elec gen 2 
INELEC - Trojes Mexico 22,6 113 Elec gen 2 
Fuerza éolica del Istmo - in 
Oaxaca 
Mexico 214  Elec gen 4 
Moldova wastewater (NM38) Moldova 72,7 218 Elec gen 1 
Soil Conservation Project Moldova 276,00  Sequestration 4 
Ulaanbaatar Mongolia 28  Heating 4 
City Council of Rabat Morocco 75,71  Elec gen 13 





Office National d’Electricité Morocco 162  Elec gen 13 
Biogas Nepal 142,9  Elec gen 4 
Vinasse aerobic treatment Nicaragua 98 187 Elec gen 1 
New wind plant Niue 0,355  Elec gen 7 
Fortuna Panama 22,4  Elec gen 17 
Esti Panama 357  Elec gen 11 
Bayano Panama 39,09 156 Elec gen 1 
Lihir Geothermal power plant Papua New 
Guinea 
287 741 Elec gen 1 
Huanza Peru 277  Elec gen 8 
Tarucani Peru 220  Elec gen 8 
Poechos Peru 31,3  Elec gen 8 
SIIF Andina S.A. Peru 200  Elec gen 8 
Cogen Philippines 200  Elec gen 4 
Panay Philippines 41,94  Elec gen 18 
Steam generator efficiency  Senegal 1,89  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
SONACOS efficiency  Senegal 86,13  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
Durban  (NM10) S. Africa 367,4 1 620 Elec gen 1 
Mondi Kraft Biomass S. Africa 64,9  Heating 9 
Small-scale CDM project Samoa 1,164  Elec gen 7 
Reforestation Solomon 
Islands 
30,9  Sequestration 7 
Small hydro Sri Lanka 94,8 190 Elec gen 10 
Hydro Swaziland 23,3 117 Elec gen 10 
A.T. Biopower (NM19) Thailand 81,6 177 Elec gen 1 
Nontaburi Thailand 55 55 Elec gen 7 
Yala Rubber Wood Thailand 60,4 190 Elec gen 3 
Korat waste-to-energy (NM41) Thailand 362,00 1 731 Elec gen 1 
Ratchasima SPP Thailand 40  Elec gen 1 
Power Generation by Landfill 
Gas  
Thailand 70 0 Elec gen 7 
Thai Biomass Electricity Thailand 378,00  Elec gen 7 
Improve efficiency of fossil fuel 
plants 
Tonga 32,8  Energy 
efficiency 
7 
Improve efficiency of power 
transmission 





M5000 (NM03) Trinidad & 
Tobago 
229  New Methanol 
Plant 
1 
West Nile hydropower  Uganda 88,34 239 Elec gen 4 
Andijan Uzbekistan 40,8 68,16 Heating 1 
Tashkent Uzbekistan 285  Heating 4 
Thuong Ly Vietnam 7,35 37,95 LFG capture 5 
Rang Dong (NM26) Vietnam 1676 5 580 Gas recovery 1 
Production of ethanol-containing 
gasoline 
Vietnam 690  Ethanol for 
gasoline 
7 
Biogas for Animal Husbandry Vietnam 270  Elec gen 4 
Grontmij Landfill Vietnam 293  LFG capture 4 
Lwakela Zambia 8,14  Elec gen 5 
Tazama pipeline  Zambia 13,88  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
Osborne Dam Zimbabwe 20  Elec gen 11 
Electric motor  Zimbabwe 15,5  Energy 
efficiency 
11 
Brick firing  Zimbabwe 14,30  Brick drying and 
firing 
11 
1 = http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies;  
2 = http://cdm.unfccc.int/Validation/PublicPDD;  
3 = http://www.dnv.com/certification/climatechange/;  
4 = http://www.carbonfinance.org/ (assuming a 10y crediting lifetime);  
5 = http://global.finland.fi/english/projects/cdm/ ; 
 6 = tp://www.cdm.or.id ;  
7 = http://gec.jp/gec/gec.nsf/en ;  
8 = http://www.fonamperu.org/general/mdl/ ;  
9 = http://www.southsouthnorth.org/ ;  
10 = personal communication with Lorenzo Eguren ;  
11 = http://www,cdmwatch.org/ ;  
12 = http://www.pembina.org/ ;  
13 = http://www.pointcarbon.org/ ;  
14 = personal communication Satoko Otani ;  
15 = personal communication Kari Hämekoski ;  
16 = http://www.ahk.org.br/cdmbrazil/projectsearch.htm; ;  
17 = Lorenxo Eguren C (2004);  
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